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Abstract
We examine why cooperation among essential patent holders for a standard
may not occur, despite signiﬁcant gains for patent holders and users of the stan-
dard. Utilizing Maskin’s (2003) framework, we show that a grand coalition can be
implemented only if the number of patent holders (n) is small. When n is large,
emergence of an outsider is inevitable, so that voluntary sequential negotiation
cannot secure the socially efﬁcient outcome. We also show that a ﬁrm specialized
in research is more likely to become an outsider. We discuss the MPEG2, DVD
and 3G patent pools in light of these results.
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11 Introduction
In this paper we examine whether ﬁrms with essential patents to a particular stan-
dard can voluntarily cooperate for efﬁcient licensing of their technologies. There is
a concern that a growing number of patents granted globally may stiﬂe innovation by
creating the “tragedy of anticommons”(see Heller and Eisenberg (1998)). That is, in-
dividual assertion of a patent right by many patentees over a given technology might
make its price prohibitively high and causes the massive underutilization of technology.
This signiﬁcantly reduces the return from the technology, thus harming the ex-ante in-
centive for developing such technology, and if the technology is a research tool, it
also harms down-stream R&D. Such concern can be especially serious in a cumula-
tive technology area such as information and communications technology, where there
are many patents and patentees involved in a particular technology. For example, in
the case of MPEG2 standard, there are more than 600 certiﬁed essential patents and
at least 23 organizations are the patentees (see table2). If each of these ﬁrms sets its
royalty freely, the total royalty to be paid by a licensee will become astronomical so
that the use of the technology will be seriously hampered. We have the inefﬁciency of
double marginalization ﬁrst pointed out by Cournot (see Shapiro (2001)).
On the other hand, a conventional view based on the “Coase theorem” suggests that
such problem can be solved by a voluntary cooperation among ﬁrms. Since collabora-
tion among ﬁrms for controlling the total royalty beneﬁts not only consumers but also
patentees themselves, that is, a coordinated reduction of individual royalty increases
the total royalty revenue available for the patentees, they would have an incentive to
cooperate in the pricing of technology. The existence of such incentive guarantees the
efﬁcient coordinated outcome according to an optimistic Coasian view. In fact, we can
think that a standard body and a standard-specifying patent pool (a collective licensing
scheme of the patents essential to a particular standard) have played a role in facil-
itating such collaboration. A standard body asks the submission of patent statement
1by the ﬁrm with an essential patent before adopting a standard. The patent statement
obliges the ﬁrm to commit itself to either royalty free licensing or licensing under
RAND (reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions) on the reciprocity basis. Thus,
when a standard is adopted, a ﬁrm presumably commits itself to the price reasonable
from the view point of standard as a whole. Since the standard body itself usually does
not get involved in royalty determination, except for the case when patentees commit
to free royalty licensing, some institutional mechanism to implement licensing on the
reasonable term is necessary. The collective licensing through a patent pool of essen-
tial patents is exactly the facility to perform this function. Firms can avoid the problem
of royalty accumulation by delegating the decision of royalty determination to a single
licensing body. Given such efﬁciency improving nature of the collaboration, antitrust
authorities have approved the standard-specifying pool under the conditions of estab-
lishing the safeguard mechanism against anticompetitive abuse, such as the restriction
of the scope of licensing to essential or complementary patents and the guarantee of
the freedom to bypass the pool1.
However, we observe that such collaboration does not necessarily occur in reality.
An outsider of the patent pool can emerge, who does not join in the pool and licenses an
essential patent independently from the pool. Although such a licensor is still subject
to the RAND (reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions) when it has participated
in the standard development, his licensing term is not bound by the licensing policy
of the patent pool. Since the standard body does not specify the level of total royalty,
without saying the level of royalty which can be collected by each patentee, the com-
mitment to licensing under RAND leaves a large discretion for each patentee in royalty
determination. Another possibility is that a patent pool for a single standard may split,
so that a licensee must obtain licenses separately from two or more group of the paten-
1See Klein (1997) for the recent articulation of the policy of the US antitrust authority toward patent
pools. See Gilbert (2004) and Priest (1977) for a historical overview of the U.S. policy toward patent pools.
See also Tirole and Lerner (2004) for the effect of the patent pool on competition, in particular, the role of
the freedom to bypass.
2tees. The breakdown of an integrated patent pool not only raises the total price to be
paid by licensees but also reduces the joint proﬁt of the patentees.
The questionis why wesee such emergenceof an outsider and the split ofthe patent
pool. In the next four sections we analyze this issue from the perspective of coalition
formation problem. Recently, Maskin (2003) pointed out the externalities among coali-
tions as an important source of the failure of forming a grand coalition, and proposed
to approach this problem from the perspective of a non-cooperative implementation
or bargaining. We adopt his framework to analyze the coalition formation problem of
standard-specifying patent pool (i.e. the pool of the patents essential to a speciﬁc stan-
dard). In section 2 and 3, we present an analysis of the coalition formation problem
when all patentees are research only ﬁrms2. In section 4 we will see that the situation is
similar when all patentees are vertically integrated so that they all produce, i.e., all are
both licensor and licensees. In section 5 we present the analysis of the case where there
are heterogeneous members: two vertically integrated ﬁrms and one research only ﬁrm.
In section 6 we discuss three cases of patent pools: MPEG2, DVD and 3G, to see how
the experience of these cases can be interpreted in light of the analytical results and
what we miss in our theory. In section 7 we conclude.
The economic literature on patent pools has developed and changed as the legal,
particularly the anti-trust, views have. Typically, a patent pool has been character-
ized as a device for extending and possibly abusing market power of patents (Gilbert
(2004)). For this reason, interest in patents pools such as standard speciﬁcation pools,
which have been sanctioned by the Anti-trust Division (Klein (1997)) has been limited.
The recent extensive examination of patent pools by Lerner and Tirole (2004) focuses
on trade-off between market power and efﬁcient use of patents by introducing partial
substitutability and addresses foreclosure and raising costs. Our interest is not this
trade-off. We argue that given the trade-off is in favor of pooling, potential efﬁciency
2We can interpret this analysis to cover also the case of vertically integrated ﬁrms which however face
Bertrand competition in manufacturing.
3may not always be realized. Our approach and interest is closer to issues related to the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (Scotchmer (2004) Chapter
6), an organization where not all potential members join. We are concerned about the
relationship between beneﬁt to pool members and stability of membership.
2 Effectsofthecoalitionbytheholdersofessentialpatents
to a particular standard
In this section, we consider the case where all ﬁrms with essential patents are special-
izedinresearch. Wewillclarifythefollowingtwomajorfeaturesofcoalitionformation
in this context. Coalition generates positive externality to outsiders. That is, an outsider
ﬁrm gains from the coalition. In addition, a coalition is super-additive only if its size
is more than a critical level. That is, the member of a small coalition loses and only
a grand coalition is super-additive when the number of ﬁrms independently collecting
royalties (n) is small.
We consider the following simple set-up. There are n research only ﬁrms (R-ﬁrm),
each of which has an essential patent to the standard. The per unit royalty of ﬁrm k is
given by rk. The market demand for the standard technology (we can consider this as
either the number of licensees or the quantity of sales incorporating the standard, we
adopt the ﬁrst interpretation) is given by
q = 1 −
X
ri. (1)
The proﬁt for ﬁrm k is given by
πk = qrk.
4The marginal proﬁt with respect to royalty for ﬁrm k is given by
∂πk
∂rk
= q − rk. (2)







Equation (2) shows that royalties are strategic substitutes (i.e. reduction of royalty by
the other ﬁrms increases the incentive of ﬁrm k to increase its royalty). Reﬂecting this,
equation (3) shows a negative relationship among the royalties of the ﬁrms.
Since the model is symmetric, we can focus on the following symmetric equilib-
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technology as follows:








The proﬁt of each ﬁrm and consumers surplus (CS) are given respectively by
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As the number of ﬁrms independently collecting royalties (n) increases, the price of
5technology increases, the number of licensee declines, and the welfare declines uni-
formly to zero, due to royalty accumulation.
Based on the above results, we can establish the above two features of coalition
making in standard. First, as shown in equation (6), the reduction of the number of
ﬁrms (n) increases the proﬁt of the remaining ﬁrms. Formation of a pool, which is
a coalition, of essential patent holders results in the reduction of the number of ﬁrms
who independently collect royalty. Thus the outsider gains from such coalition. As
equation (4) shows, such coalition causes the outsider to increase its royalty reﬂecting
the strategic substitute relationship in the pricing of the essential patents, even though
the total royalty falls due to the coalition as shown in equation (5). Thus, coalition
generates positive externality to outsiders.
Lemma 1. There is a positive externality of a coalition by the ﬁrms having essential
patents with respect to a standard.
Let us then see the effect of a coalition on its members. Let us consider m-ﬁrm
coalition. If m ﬁrms cooperate and form a patent pool, the number of ﬁrms who inde-
pendently imposes royalty declines from n to (n − m + 1). The gain or loss for the
member of coalition is given by
π(n − m + 1) − mπ(n) =
1
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(n − m + 2)2(n + 1)2 .
Thus, the coalition is super-additive only if









That is, the size of a coalition has to be larger than a critical size (mcr), in order for
6it to be super-additive. On the other hand, a coalition of small size which is less than
the critical size is sub-additive. The basic reason is the following. If the outsiders of a
coalition do not change their royalties in response to the coalition, even a small coali-
tion can gain by eliminating double marginalization among the members. However,
outsiders will increase their royalties in response to the coordinated reduction of the
royalties by the members of the coalition, due to the strategic substitute nature of pric-
ing in this case. This latter effect reduces the proﬁt of the insiders. When the coalition
size is small, the ﬁrst effect is small but the second effect is large. Thus, small coalition
is sub-additive, while a large coalition is super-additive.
The critical size coincides with the number of essential patent holders n, allowing
the integer constraint, when n is small. According to equation (7), the critical size
coincides with n for n ≤ 4. The critical size of a coalition increases as n increases. In
terms of the coverage ratio (mcr/n), the minimum coverage approaches 100% as the
number of the ﬁrms n. Thus, we have the following Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. A coalition is super-additive only if its size is more than a critical level.
Such coalition can only be a grand coalition when the number of ﬁrms independently
collecting royalties (n) is small. Such critical size increases with n and the necessary
coverage for a super-additive coalition approaches 100% as n becomes indeﬁnitely
large.
Figure 1 illustrates the basic results thus far obtained. The horizontal axis (n) mea-
sures the number of ﬁrms which have essential patents and collect royalties indepen-
dently. As n increases, the price of technology increases and the welfare declines
uniformly to zero, both due to worsening problem of royalty accumulation. Only the
grand coalition is super-additive if n is less than or equal to 4. The coalition with only
one outsider or less is super-additive if n is more than 4 but less than or equal to 10. A
two-ﬁrm coalition is proﬁt-making only if it is a grand coalition.
73 Coalition formation problem among research ﬁrms
Let us consider whether the grand coalition can be formed in the above model. It
critically depends on the number of ﬁrms. As shown above, when n is small, there
is no coalition other than the grand coalition which is super-additive. In this case we
show that there is an implementation which achieves the grand coalition even if the
coalition has a free rider problem, due to the sub-additive nature of smaller coalitions.
On the other hand, when n is large, there is a coalition other than the grand coalition
which is super-additive. In this case, we show that the grand coalition does not form.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider two cases: n = 3 (ﬁrm a, b and c) and
n = 5 (ﬁrm a, b, c, d, and e). The payoff relevant for the coalition decisions is shown
in Table 1. In the latter case of 5 ﬁrms, the coalition of 4 ﬁrms breaks even. We assume
that ﬁrms prefer a coalition when it breaks even with non-coalition, assuming that a
coalition per se generates a small extra value ( > 0). We denote the payoff for a
coalition C in the case of N ﬁrm independent pricing by v(C | N) . Thus, the payoff
for the coalition, or the value of the coalition, of ﬁrm b and c when two ﬁrms (ﬁrm a
and the coalition bc) independently collect royalties is given by v(bc | 2).
3.1 Case of three ﬁrms(a,b,c)
Let us consider the order of arrival is a, b, and then c. In this case of three ﬁrms, two-
ﬁrm coalition is sub-additive. That is,v(bc | 2) = 0.1111 < v(b | 3) + v(c | 3) =
0.1250. This means that if one of the ﬁrms commits not to joining the coalition, the
other ﬁrms will not form a coalition. Thus, the ﬁrst ﬁrm a can foresee that he gets only
v(a | 3) = 0.0625 if he commits not to joining the coalition. On the other hand, he
can be sure that his offer of a coalition with b will be accepted. Because if b refuses it,
b is sure that no coalition will be made (so that he payoff is 0.0625). Thus, we have a
coalition ab as a team for further negotiation with ﬁrm c.
This coalition ab can increase the value by expanding the coalition ﬁrm c, since the
8grand coalition is super-additive. That is, while c can enjoy a relatively high payoff
(v(c | 2) = 0.1111) even if the grand coalition is formed, the coalition ab can offer
ﬁrm c more than this payoff with a positive residual remaining for itself:
v(abc | 1) − v(c | 2) = 0.25 − 0.1111 = 0.1399 > v(ab | 2) = 0.1111.
Thus, we expect that the grand coalition or the patent pool with full members can
be formed based on the voluntary negotiations.
The ﬁnal payoff allocation is the following: vF(a) = 0.0764, vF(b) = 0.0625
and vF(c) = 0.1111.3 The last ﬁrm c which enters into the negotiations obtains the
most, since the formation of the coalition ab for a negotiation makes his potential proﬁt
when he stays an outsider to the pool large. Thus, there is no ﬁrst mover advantage in
initiating the negotiations for the grand coalition. Thus, unless some ﬁrm is compelled
to initiate the process, we may have the inefﬁcient delay due to the war of attrition.
3.2 Case of ﬁve ﬁrms (a,b,c,d,e)
Let us consider the order of arrival is a,b,c,d and then e. We consider the question
of whether ﬁrm a should start negotiation for the coalition or commit itself to being
an outsider. In this case of ﬁve ﬁrms, both the grand coalition and four -ﬁrm coalition
is super-additive, given our assumption that a coalition generates a small extra value
( > 0). That is, v(bcde | 2) = 0.1111 +  > v(b | 5) + v(c | 5) + v(d | 5) + v(e |
5) = 0.1111. The rest of smaller coalitions are sub-additive.
If the ﬁrst ﬁrm a commits not to joining a coalition, the other ﬁrms will form a
coalition of four members. This is because if the second ﬁrm b decides not to form a
coalition, he can expect that no coalitions will be formed since the remaining coalitions
have only the size of less than four. Thus, he can expect only the payoff of v(b | 5) =
3We denote by superscript F that it is the ﬁnal allocation. Although not explicitly stated, the ﬁnal alloca-
tion depends on the ﬁnal coalitions formed, as well as structure of the coalition formation, in particular the
order in which ﬁrms move.
90.0278. Thus, the second ﬁrm will move to initiate the coalition formation process.
The rest of the ﬁrms will follow the initiative, since if any one of the ﬁrms refuses to
do so, the coalition will not be formed. Thus, the coalition of bcde will be formed.
Thus, in this scenario, the ﬁnal payoff allocation is :vF(a) = v(a | 2) = 0.1111 and
vF(b) + vF(c) + vF(d) + vF(e) = v(bcde | 2) = 0.1111 + .
Let us consider the second scenario where ﬁrm a offers a coalition for b. In this
case, ﬁrm a has to make a large payment to ﬁrm b so as to make him to participate in
the coalition, since the refusal by ﬁrm b will put the rest of the ﬁrms (including ﬁrm
a) to form a coalition, based on the same reasoning as that of the above paragraph,
and ﬁrm b can get the payoff of being outsider (0.1111). This threat leaves ﬁrm a very
little of the surplus from the grand coalition, since the rest of the ﬁrms have to get the
minimum (0.0278) for joining in the grand coalition. That is
Payoff for ﬁrm a if he offers a coalition to ﬁrm b
= 0.25 − 0.1111 − 3 × 0.0278− = 0.0555.
This payoff is clearly smaller than the case where ﬁrm a commits not to joining in the
coalition.
Thus, we can expect that the grand coalition will not be formed in this case. The
equilibrium partition is {a,bcde}: one outsider ﬁrm and the coalition of the rest of the
ﬁrms. The ﬁrst ﬁrm a gets 0.1111, the second ﬁrm gets 0.0278 +  and the rest of the
ﬁrm gets 0.0278. In this case there is a ﬁrst mover advantage but it is negative in a
sense that he can gain only by committing to not to joining the coalition. Why does not
the outsider a and the coalition bcde negotiate ex-post for the grand coalition, despite
the fact that it is Pareto-improving? This is because it is against the commitment of
ﬁrm a not to joint in the coalition. Firm a can achieve the above payoff only if it can
force the rest of the ﬁrms to form a coalition without ﬁrm a, and this is possible only if
it can credibly commit not to joining in the coalition.
10What makes the different outcome between the two cases? In the latter case, the
number of ﬁrms with essential patents is large, so that the problem of double marginal-
ization is more serious. Thus, even one ﬁrm staying out of the coalition still makes the
rest of the ﬁrms willing to form a coalition. In the former case there is no such prof-
itable coalition less than the grand coalition. Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. A grand coalition can be implemented only if the number of essential
patent holders (n) is small. When n is large, the emergence of outsider is inevitable, so
that the voluntary negotiation cannot secure the socially efﬁcient outcome.
4 Only Vertically Integrated Firms
Let us examine the situation when all the patent holders are all vertically integrated,
i.e., they also produce. We refer to such a ﬁrm as a V -ﬁrm. Decisions are made
sequentially: licensors(independentﬁrmsandpatentpool)willrespectiveroyaltyrates,
then ﬁrms decide on output, taking royalty as given. In particular, pool member ﬁrms
choose outputs independently, for antitrust reasons. For simplicity we assume that
products are perfectly differentiated so that each ﬁrm is a monopolist in its own market,
each with demand q = 1 − p, where q is the output and p is price of the good.4 The
only marginal cost is the license royalty. When it pays total royalty r to licenses, ﬁrm i
chooses the monopoly output when marginal cost is r, q(r) ≡ (1 − r)/2.
With vertically integrated ﬁrms, there is a question of if the pool should charge
royalty to its members or not. A royalty rule where a pool charges the same rate to
its members as non-members is called non-discriminatory licensing. If a pool charges
a different royalty to members, then it is discriminatory licensing5 and it will be op-
timal to charge nothing to its members, i.e., cross-license. Our analysis will focus on
4Thusthere isnostrategic interactionamongpatent holdersinthe ﬁnalgoodsmarket evenwhenvertically
integrated, unlike Lerner and Tirole (2004). This assumption also makes collusion of outputs useless.
5If the licensees are heterogeneous, then discriminatory licensing may also entail different rates among
non-members.
11discriminatory licensing.
Let us see what the allocations are with n V -ﬁrms. When there are no coalitions,
each ﬁrm charges ri to the other ﬁrms and pays rj to ﬁrm j, (j = 1,··· ,i − 1,i +



















The ﬁrst term is proﬁt from production, the second term is the licensing revenue. Since






and ﬁrm output and proﬁt are,














Now consider the case where m (< n ) ﬁrms form a pool. There are k ≡ n − m
independent ﬁrms. The total number of licensors is k + 1 (one pool and k ﬁrms) and


















The ﬁrst term is the production proﬁt of its m members and the second term is the rev-
enue fromlicensing tok independentﬁrms. Pool members payroyalty tonon-members
and the pool collects royalty from the non-members. The non-member (independent)
























The ﬁrms and the pool set their royalties to maximize respective proﬁt but the only part
that matters is the licensing revenue. The royalty rate is determined by the number of







An independent ﬁrm pays total royalty (k−1)r∗
k +r∗
0 = k/(k+1) and a pool member
pays kr∗


























4(n − m + 1)2. (9)
As in the previous sections, we will use v(k|m) to denote allocation of ﬁrm k (or
coalitionkj withmembersk andj )whenthesizeofthepoolism. (Wedonotconsider
conﬁguration with two or more pools each with more than two members). The values
for general m and n are given by (8) and (9):
v(1···m|m) = π∗
0, v(1|1) = ˆ π∗
n.
To check super-additivity, we inspect
δ(m) ≡ v(1···m|m) − mv(1|1) =
2n − m







13We used k = n − m. We note that,
δ(1) = 0, δ0(1) = −
(n − 1)2
2n3 < 0, δ00(m) =
4n − m − 2
2(n − m + 1)4 > 0,
and
δ0(n) =
2n3 − n2 − 2n + 1
4n2 , δ(n − 1) =
n3 − 7n2 + 12n − 4
16n2 ,
are positive for sufﬁciently large n. This implies that for sufﬁciently large ne, there is
a ˆ m(n) < n such that,
δ(m) S 0 ⇔ m S ˆ m(n).
In particular, we can make the following claim.
Lemma 3. When there are only V -ﬁrms, there will be a sub-coalition that is super-
additive when n is sufﬁciently large.
The explanation for this is the same as for coalitions of when there are only research
ﬁrms. Larger pools mean less double marginalization but outsider’s royalty becomes
larger. When the latter effect dominates, coalition reduces proﬁts.
5 V and R ﬁrms
We now show that there will be super-additive sub-coalition of V ﬁrms for sufﬁciently
large number of ﬁrms even when there is an R ﬁrm. There are n V -ﬁrms and one
R-ﬁrm. If all n ﬁrms are independent, every producer (V -ﬁrm) pays royalty to n ﬁrms.
Royalty rate charged by all ﬁrms is 1/(n + 1) each. Each independent ﬁrm’s proﬁt is,
















When m V -ﬁrms form a coalition, there are k = n−m independent V -ﬁrms. Each
producer pays royalty to k + 1 ﬁrms, either the pool, R-ﬁrm and k − 1 independent













2n − m + 2
2(n − m + 2)
q(
n − m + 1
n − m + 2
),
using k = n − m. As with the case with only V -ﬁrms, super-additivity means
δR(m) ≡ πR
0 − mˆ πR > 0.
This must be true for sufﬁciently large n since the ﬁrst term is convex, the second term
is linear in m and
δR(n) =
n(n2 − 6n + 5)
16(n + 1)2 .
We can deﬁne a similar measurement of super-additivity when there are n + 1 V -
ﬁrms using (10). We deﬁne as δV (m) the value of δ(m) when total number of ﬁrms is
n + 1 instead of n. One can show
δR(n) > δV (n).
This means whenever n V -ﬁrms are super-additive when (n+1)-th ﬁrm is a V -ﬁrm, it
is also super-additive when (n + 1)-th ﬁrm is a R-ﬁrm.
Now we ask the question, which outsider is more likely to occur, R-ﬁrm or V -ﬁrm.
Think of the situation where there are n+1 ﬁrms: n+1 V -ﬁrms or n V -ﬁrms and one
R-ﬁrms. We have veriﬁed that sub-coalition can form for sufﬁciently large n for both
cases. First we claim the following:
Lemma 4. A coalition of n − 1 V -ﬁrms will bid more to V -ﬁrm to join than to R-ﬁrm
to join its coalition.
Proof. Independent of which ﬁrm joins the coalition, there will be 2 licensors. Thus
equilibrium royalty and outputs do not differ according to which ﬁrm joins the pool.
15The pool’s license revenue which only comes from the outsider will be the same. But if
V -ﬁrm joins the coalition, there will be production proﬁt. There will be no production
proﬁt if R-ﬁrm joins the coalition.
When any ﬁrm, V-ﬁrm or R-ﬁrm, joins a pool, it reduces inefﬁciency of double
marginalization for other members. Because a V-ﬁrm pays royalty, itself beneﬁts by
joining the pool since it eliminates double marginalization. There is no such beneﬁt to
a R-ﬁrm from joining.
We know now that if there are sufﬁciently many ﬁrms, a coalition of n V -ﬁrms
will form, instead of coalition with one R, if both ﬁrms are willing to join. However
a coalition of n − 1 V -ﬁrms and R-ﬁrm will form if one V -ﬁrm has committed not to
negotiate. Similarly if R-ﬁrm commits not to negotiate, then a coalition of n V -ﬁrms
will form. Which ﬁrm has more to gain from making such a commitment? In answer
to this question, we claim that,
Lemma 5. R-ﬁrm’s proﬁt as an outsider is greater than that of a V -ﬁrm.
Proof. With one outsider and one pool, the equilibrium royalty is 1/2 and output is


















When V -ﬁrm is the outsider, the pool and outsider proﬁts are,
πV

























Suppose pool revenue is allocated proportional to number of patents. Then the
















That is, R-ﬁrm has more to gain. If there are n V -ﬁrms and one R-ﬁrm, and if ﬁrms
can compete for a chance to commit not to negotiate, then the R-ﬁrm will bid higher
and will actually commit not to negotiate and becomes an outsider. This is consistent
with the emergence of research only ﬁrms as an outsider.
It is important to note that this result is independent of how pool proﬁts are dis-
tributed among members. Thus it is not only the distribution rule that prompts an
R-ﬁrm not to join a patent pool as was suggested by Aoki and Nagaoka (2004).
6 Some evidence from MPEG, DVD and 3G standard
In this section, we review the experiences of three standard-specifying patent pools
from the viewpoint of coalition making. In particular, we would like to see how the
process of coalition making worked in light of the above analytical results, and what
we miss in our theory. The above analysis suggests that outsiders are more likely to
emerge, that is, the grand coalition is less likely to be achieved, when the number
of ﬁrms having the essential patents is large, essentially because the defection of a
few ﬁrms still keeps the pool of the rest of the member worthwhile, and that a ﬁrm
specialized in research is more likely to become an outsider than a vertically integrated
ﬁrm.
(1) MPEG2
In the case of MPEG2, the number of the member ﬁrms of the patent pool was origi-
nally 8 organizations, including one university, when it started licensing in September
1997. The number of the members expanded to 23 organizations as of April 2004. The
17members include both manufacturers (17 ﬁrms) who are also licensees but also pure
licensors, including complementors (telecommunications ﬁrms), ﬁrms specialized in
licensing and a University. In terms of the coverage of essential patents, the share of
the original members accounts for 60% of the patents which are being offered by the
MPEG patent pool in 2004. Thus, there was a signiﬁcant expansion of the member-
ship in terms of the patent coverage since the establishment of the pool. According to
an industry expert, the MPEG patent pool now covers more than 90% of the essential
patents for the MPEG2 standard. There are two important non-members of the patent
pool: IBM and Lucent Technology. However, IBM is engaged in extensive cross-
licensing contracts with many licensors who participants in the MPEG2 pool, and it is
not a licensee of the pool.
The case of MPEG2 in successfully expanding the coalition suggests that there may
be important advantages of a pool, besides the control of royalty accumulation. First,
the pool offers the advantage of ”one-stop shopping”. The number of licensees in the
case of MPEG2 reaches 734 ﬁrms. Negotiating a contract with all of these ﬁrms could
be expensive for an individual licensor and a licensee. Second, the pool may have
the economy of scale in verifying the essentiality of the patents. Such certiﬁcation
is critical for a patentee to be able to collect royalty. Certiﬁcation of the essential
patents is a highly complex task, which requires the detailed knowledge of the standard
speciﬁcation. Hiring a common third party expert may be able to reduce the overall
cost of such certiﬁcation. In addition, the pool has a mechanism to allow the other
members of the pool to challenge the essentiality of the patents. This ”opposition
”system may increase the credibility of the evaluations of the essentiality of the patents
by a pool. A ﬁrm with an essential patent can exploit these advantages of a pool only
if it participates in the pool. That is, in our framework, the “epsilon” is quite large,
making some coalitions actually super-additive.
We may also point out the fact that a licensor seeking an independent licensing for
18high royalty would face the resistance by a licensee, since independent licensing only
increases the total cost of technology for the licensee. On the other hand, the expansion
of the member ﬁrms of the pool means no additional cost for the licensees, since the
pool commits to the ﬁxed ceiling of the total royalty to be paid by a licensee for all
essential patents offered by the pool.
(2) DVD
Let us turn to the case of DVD. 10 ﬁrms agreed to the DVD standard in December
1995. While they originally aimed at providing a one-stop shopping facility for licens-
ing the standard information, essential patents, and logo, Thomson decided to license
its patents independently.6 Following this, three ﬁrms (Sony, Philips and Pioneer) also
decided to choose independent licensing but collectively (the formation of 3C group).
The rest of the ﬁrms (six companies: 6C) decided to collectively license its technol-
ogy through a patent pool. Thus, even the ﬁrms which participated in the standard
development could not form a single patent pool and got split into the three licensing
parties. Both groups widely license its technology (179 licensee in the case of 3C and
245 ﬁrms in the case of 6C for hardware, see Table 2). As a result, a manufacturer of
DVD players has to currently pay royalties to each of three parties (5 dollar per unit
for 3C, 4 dollar per unit for 6C and unknown amount to Thomson). We understand
that the disagreement among the ﬁrms with respect to the distribution formula of the
royalty was behind the split of the pool. 6C adopted the formula, which distributes the
royalty revenue of the pool to a participant based on the number of its essential patents,
in the same way as MPEG2. 3C and Thomson look to be unsatisﬁed with such pro-rata
formula.
It is important to note that a ﬁrm can increase its proﬁt by moving to independent
licensing by defecting the patent pool using the pro-rata formula for royalty distribu-
tion, if its patent share is signiﬁcantly less than half and it can expect that the rest of
6Thomson is a licensee of 4C.
19the ﬁrms will stick to the patent pool (it can be so for whatever the level of royalty,
see Aoki and Nagaoka (2004)). This is because the party can aim at collecting the half
of the total royalty paid by the licensees through independent licensing and the total
royalty will not signiﬁcantly decline as long as the rest of the patent pool does not dis-
integrate (see the analysis in the above theoretical sections). In the case of DVD, it is
estimated that the patent share of 3C group is about 42% of the total patents owned by
3C and 6C for a DVD player based on US patents, while the royalty share of 3C group
is 56%(=5$/(5$+4$)). Thus, the pool adopting the pro-rata formula is vulnerable to the
defection of a ﬁrm who claims that their contribution of technology is more than the
number of the essential patents.
(3) 3G(W-CDMA)
Let us ﬁnally cover 3G. There are 5 standards (W-CDMA, cdma2000, TD-CDMA,
EDGE and DECT) which were approved by the ITU. 3G patent platform for collective
licensing was proposed and approved by the DOJ on the condition that the essential
patents of each standard will be independently licensed. The patent platform began
to evaluate essential patents of the participating ﬁrms in order to start the collective
licensing of the essential patents for W-CDMA standard. The platform has the policy
of committing to the maximum collective royalty rate of 5% and each essential patent is
allocated 0.1% royalty until the collective royalty reaches this maximum value. Thus,
the distribution of royalty follows the pro-rata formula as in the case of MPEG2 and
6C.
According to the declarations to the ARIB (Association of Radio Industries and
Businesses, Japan), there are more than 30 ﬁrms who have self-declared essential
patents (not certiﬁed by a third party), and the number of the candidates for essential
patents amount to more than 950 in terms of the number of patent families. Qualcomm
alone accounts for about half of the essential patents declared to ARIB in terms of
20patent families. There are 14 ﬁrms which have more than 4 families of patents. On the
other hand, the members committing to the collective license for W-CDMA are limited
to 7 ﬁrms (four Japanese ﬁrms, two European ﬁrms and one Korea ﬁrm) up to now,
although there are more ﬁrms who support the 3G patent platform per se. Qualcomm,
Motorola, Ericsson and Nokia, which would have substantial essential patents, are not
the members of the pool.
Whether a single patent platform can be formed in the case of W-CDMA is still
uncertain. One of the key issues is whether the pro-rata formula rewards adequately
the ﬁrm which has many important patents, such as Qualcomm. A ﬁrm with important
technology contribution would choose independent licensing especially if the pro-rata
formula signiﬁcantly under-rewards such ﬁrm, as noted earlier. Second, a pure license
ﬁrm gains more from being an outsider to the pool, as shown in section 5. Third, a ﬁrm
has strong patent positions both in W-CDMA technology and in cdma2000. Fourth,
the cooperation by the other ﬁrms through a 3G platform will actually make it more
attractive for a ﬁrm to stay as an outsider.
7 Conclusions
We have analyzed why cooperation among essential patent holders does not necessar-
ily occur in reality, despite its signiﬁcant gain for them and for users. Based on the
analytical framework of Maskin (2003) on sequential negotiation for a coalition for-
mation, we have shown that a grand coalition can be implemented only if the number
of essential patent holders (n) is small. When n is large, the emergence of an outsider
is inevitable, so that the voluntary sequential negotiation cannot secure the socially
efﬁcient outcome. There are two reasons for this outcome. First, a ﬁrm can gain by be-
coming an outsider and such gain increases as the coalition of the other ﬁrms expands.
Second, the rest of the ﬁrms want to have a coalition, even if there is an outsider, when
the number of ﬁrms is large so that the cost of double marginalization is high. Thus,
21there is indeed a risk of the tragedy of anti-commons.
In addition, we have also shown that even in the case where a grand coalition can
be formed, the initiator of such ﬁrm can not gain much, since the other ﬁrms can
gain from being an outsider. Thus, there is a risk of delay due to war of attrition,
since each ﬁrm wants other ﬁrms to take the initiative to develop a patent pool for
a standard. Furthermore, we have shown that a ﬁrm specialized in research is more
likely to become an outsider than a vertically integrated ﬁrm, since such ﬁrm has the
ﬁrst mover advantage in setting the price of its technology. Thus, as technology market
develops and the number of ﬁrms specialized in research increases, the collaborative
venture for a standard setting may become more difﬁcult.
The actual experiences of the standard-specifying patent pool indeed show that the
grand coalition is not easy to achieve. In the case of the DVD reader there are at least
three groups of essential patent holders which provide the licensing of technologies.
The 3G patent platform could start only in a small coalition. On the other hand, the
MPEG2 case suggests that the standard-setting patent pool may have the substantial
coalition beneﬁts such as the low cost of one-stop shopping, besides the gain from
avoiding royalty accumulation. In this case, the coverage of the coalition has signiﬁ-
cantly expanded over time. However, this case may be more an exception.
How can we improve the situation? There may be several policy options to con-
sider. We focus what standard bodies may undertake, since this is more a market-base
solution. First, a standard body may wish to clarify the basic principles which help the
licensor and the licensee to determine what RAND conditions imply, in particular, what
the reasonable royalty of each patent is. Such clariﬁcation will reduce the gain from
being an outsider. The reasonable royalty of a patent cannot be individually negotiated
if it is one of the patents essential to the standard. The price of each patent has to be
reasonable in light of the total royalty for the technology as a whole. Second, a stan-
dard body may wish to ask the group of the ﬁrms sponsoring the standard to announce
22not only the technology speciﬁcations of a standard but also the maximum price of the
standard. Such requirement will force the essential patent holders to focus on the pric-
ing of the standard itself and to commit to it before the adoption of the standard. Third,
a standard body may prepare the following option of the patent statement in addition
to the existing statements: a patentee is wiling to provide a license under RAND, and
to do so collaboratively if and only if his patent is a part of the essential patents to the
standard.
23References
Aoki, Reiko and Sadao Nagaoka, 2004. “The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools,”
The Economic Review (Keizai Kenkyu), 55(4):345-356.
Gilbert, Richard, 2004. “Antitrust of Patent Pools: A Century of Policy Evolution”,
Stanford Technology Law Review 3,
http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/04_STLR_3
Heller, Michael A. and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 1998, “Can Patents Deter innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research,” 280, Science, 698.
Klein, Joel L., 1997.“Cross-Licensing and Antitrust Law,” Address before the A Intel-
lectual Property Law Association.
Lerner, Joshua and Jean Tirole, 2004. “Efﬁciency of Patent Pools”, American Eco-
nomic Review, 94(3), 691-711.
Maskin, Eric, 2003. “Bargaining, Coalitions, and Externalities,” Presidential address
to the Econometric Society.
Priest, George, 1977. “Cartels, and Patent License Arrangements,” Journal of Law and
Economics, 20(2):302-377.
Scotchmer, Suzanne, 2004. Innovation and Incentives, MIT Press.
Shapiro, Carl, 2001, “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross License, Patent Pools and
Standard-Setting,” in Innovation Policy and the Economy, edited by Adam Jaffe,
Joshua Lerner, and Scott Stern, MIT Press.
24Table 1: Nash pricing and effects of coalition
(A)Proﬁt of each ﬁrm when n ﬁrms engage in independent pricing
Number of ﬁrms(n)
1 2 3 4 5
p 0.5 0.3333 0.2500 0.2000 0.1667
P = np 0.5 0.6667 0.7500 0.8000 0.8333
Q
0.25 0.1111 0.0625 0.0400 0.0278
total
Q
0.25 0.2222 0.1875 0.1600 0.1389
(B)Payoff to a coalition
Number of ﬁrms
2 3 4 5
2 0.0278 -0.0139 -0.0175 -0.0156
Size of a 3 0.0625 -0.0089 -0.0208
coalition 4 0.0900 0.0000
5 0.1111
25Table 2: Recent Standard Patent Pools







any ﬁrm that has an
essential patent can
participate; currenlty
22 ﬁrms, 1 univ.
1. The contract term is from 10 and a half to 15 and a half years.
2. For MPEG-2 decoding products, the royalty is US $4.00 for each
decode unit. A royalty of US $6 per unit applies to Consumer Products
having both encoding and decoding capabilities. (Both of which prior
to Jan. 1, 2002, and $2.50 from Jan. 1, 2002.) Etc.
3. Licensees have the right to renew for successive ﬁve-year periods for
the life of any MPEG-2 Patent Portfolio Patent, subject to reasonable
amendment of royalty terms and rates (not to increase by more than
25%).




1. Each ﬁrms can license indepen-
dently.
2. The allocation of royalties de-
pends on the share of patents con-
tributed to the pool.
DVD(3C),
1998
Philips Philips, Sony, Pio-
neer
1. The contract term is 10 years.
2. Commitment to royalty (royalties of 3.5% of the net selling price for
each player sold, subject to a minimum fee of $7 per unit, which drops
to $5 as of Jan. 1, 2000 and $.05 per disc sold.)
3. A most favorable conditions clause.
4. An obligation for licensee to grant-back any essential patent on fair,
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.
115 patents for the man-
ufacture of DVD players,
95 patents for the manu-
facture of the discs.
Future essential patents
1. Each ﬁrms can license indepen-
dently.
2. The allocation of royalties is not
a function of the number of patents








1. The contracts run until Dec. 31, 2007 and renew automatically for
5-years terms thereafter.
2. Commitment to royalty (royalties of $.075 per DVD Disc and 4% of
the net sales price of DVD players and DVD decoders, with a minimum
royalty of $4.00 per player or decoder)
3. A most-favored-nations clause
4. An obligation for licensee to grantback any essential patent on fair,
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.
Allthepresentandfuture
essential patents
1. Each ﬁrms can license indepen-
dently.
2. The allocation of royalties de-
pends on the share of patents con-







19 ﬁrms (8 operators,
11 manufacturers)
1. Maximum Cumulative Royalty is 5%.
2. Standard Royalty Rate per certiﬁed essential patent is 0.1% (How-
ever, the option to negotiate a bi-lateral agreement is available)
All the essential patents
of the member ﬁrms
1. Members able to by-pass and li-
cense independently with mutually
agreeable terms.
2. The allocation of royalties de-
pends on the share of patents con-
tributed to the pool.
Source: Nagata(2002); http://www.3gpatents.com; http://www.mpegla.com; DOJ Review Letter from Joel Klein to Carey R. Ramos, June
10, 1999; DOJ Review Letter from Joel Klein to Gerrard R. Beeney, December 16, 1998.
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Minimum coverage of a super-
additive coalition
Gain from a  two-firm coalition